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On the Opportunism-Independent Theory of the Firm 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either 
restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based 
perspective.  However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be 
developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in 
nature.   This depends on ‘direction’, that is deriving economic value by permitting one 
set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. 
Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organization, but also the 
existence of firms without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. I also consider the 
extent to which it is meaningful to speak of ‘contractual’ theories in the absence of 
opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract 
to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore some steps in the development of an opportunism-
independent theory of firm boundaries and firm existence which nevertheless retains a 
contractual vision of the firm.  The importance of this topic lies in recent debates on the 
role of opportunism within two of the principal theories employed in economics and 
strategy: transaction-cost analysis, and the capabilities or resource-based perspective of 
the firm. 
 
The centrality of opportunism to transaction-cost analysis has been the matter of debate 
for several years (Alchian and Woodward 1988; Williamson 1993; Stephen 1996). More 
recently attention has shifted to the role of opportunism within theories of the firm that 
are not dependent on transaction costs; predominantly, this refers to the capabilities or 
resource-based approach. Some writers explicitly view the resource-based approach as a 
form of opportunism-independent theory of the firm (Conner and Prahalad 1996).  Others 
argue that although knowledge-based theories can tell us something about the boundaries 
or organization of the (multi-person) firm, they cannot give a convincing explanation for 
its existence (Foss 1996a,b), and as a result, we are not really any closer to developing an 
opportunism-independent theory of the existence of the firm. I suggest a different 
perspective, one in which an opportunism-independent vision of the firm is not 
necessarily linked to the capabilities approach.  I argue that it is possible to say something 
about why firms exist in the absence of concepts such as opportunism or moral hazard, 
and that it is possible to have a theory of the firm which is opportunism-free, but which 
retains a contractual focus. This analysis depends crucially on the argument that 
contractual issues do not everywhere and always hinge on (Williamsonian) opportunism, 
and that contracts can have functions beyond those merely of incentive alignment to 
prevent wrongdoing. 
This article proceeds as follows.  First, I suggest why an opportunism-independent theory 
of the firm is a topic worthy of consideration, and discuss two partial developments 
towards such a theory. Secondly, I argue that it is possible to have opportunism-
independent theories both of the existence and of the organization of the firm, and I give 
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examples of such theories based on the work of Harold Demsetz and Ronald Coase which 
depend on knowledge and information costs and specialization benefits.  Thirdly, I tackle 
the issue of whether a contractual approach is meaningful in the absence of opportunism, 
and consider whether a worthwhile theory of the firm must move beyond the employment 
contract and deal satisfactorily with wider issues such as the ownership of assets.  Finally, 
I outline areas in which theoretical and empirical research could help in our 
understanding of opportunism-independence, and suggest that, although it is indeed 
possible to have an opportunism-independent yet contractual vision of the firm, there is 
merit in other theoretical approaches in reminding us that the firm is not solely a 
contractual entity. 
 
 
2.  Opportunism-independent Approaches to the Firm 
Why do we need an opportunism-independent theory? 
The reason we should be interested in an opportunism-independent theory is because in 
its absence both economists and writers in strategy have developed an unnecessarily 
narrow conception both of the firm and of the determinants of its boundaries.  In the case 
of strict adherents to transaction-cost economics, this is because of the Williamsonian 
view that hold-up cannot exist in the absence of opportunism. This in turn has led to an 
unwillingness to acknowledge hold-up problems arising from small numbers conditions 
which can be independent of rent-seeking opportunism or specific assets; for example, 
time critical production where a delay in obtaining a crucial component may give rise to 
such large losses that in-house production will be favoured regardless of the number of 
potential suppliers or the likelihood of opportunistic hold-up being exercised1. Breaking 
this link between specific assets, opportunism and hold-up, unthinkable in Williamsonian 
transaction-cost analysis, can enrich our understanding of firm boundaries and existence.  
In the case of those who take a broader view of the existence of the firm, but nevertheless 
believe it must be inherently contractual, opportunism is central to the contractual view of 
                                                          
1 Masten et al (1991) employ the term ‘temporal specificity’ to deal with the situation of time-critical 
production, explicitly regarding it as an element of asset specificity.  In fact, time-criticality neeed have 
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the firm: what role do contracts play if parties are never at risk from opportunism? 
However, questioning the role of opportunism may help to bring the issue of the 
contractual nature of the firm into sharper focus: as I argue below, contracts can play a 
role which goes beyond the narrow scope of incentive alignment to protect from wrong-
doing by one or other party to a contract. And finally, for those concerned with strategy, 
moving towards an opportunism-independent theory permits a broader conception of the 
firm which fits more naturally with the capabilities or resource-based view.  Conner and 
Prahalad (1996:480) argue strongly that strategy writers need a theory of the firm to 
consider properly issues relating to differences in firms’ attributes and performance, and 
Madhok (1996) sees the knowledge-based theory explicitly as “an attempt to develop an 
opportunism-independent theoretical understanding of the firm.” (1996: 578)  Therefore 
from several perspectives we have an interest in seeing whether it is possible to develop 
such a theory.  
    
But this requires us first to be clear on what we understand by ‘the firm’ and by  
‘opportunism’.  Let us accept that the firm is most satisfactorily conceived of as a multi-
person entity2 and ought surely to involve more than merely an employment contract, 
which is the limited view of the firm envisaged by inter alia Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
and Wernerfelt (1997). On opportunism, the starting point is often taken as Oliver 
Williamson’s definition as “…self-interest seeking with guile.  This includes but is 
scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying stealing and cheating.  Opportunism 
more often involves more subtle forms of deceit….” (Williamson, 1985: 47).  Williamson 
does not assume that all economic agents are always opportunistic, or even that 
opportunism always pays.  The difficulty arises in determining ex ante which possible 
contracting partners are likely to behave in this way, and discriminating between those 
circumstances under which opportunism will pay and those when it will not.  Transaction 
costs can then arise from the need to protect against the likelihood of, and potential loss 
that may arise from, opportunistic behaviour by another party. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
little to do with specific assets of any kind, nor, as suggested above, with the presence of opportunism 
(Stephen and Love 2000). 
2 There is a sub-literature on whether it is meaningful to speak of single-person entities as firms (e.g. Fourie 
1993; Hodgson 1993), but for present purposes this is a somewhat sterile debate. 
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However, other writers have adopted visions of opportunism which do not depend on 
guile or deceitfulness, but which can encompass a much wide range of human behaviour 
such as ‘honest disagreements’ (Alchian and Woodward, 1988) and simply the act of 
following self-interest at the expense of others (Goldberg, 1984).  As Stephen (1996) 
points out, this milder version of opportunism may still give rise to transaction costs 
because of the need for parties investing in transaction-specific capital to guard against 
ex-post hold up.  This is because virtually any kind of self-interested behaviour short of 
actual deceit may preclude the use of a self-enforcing ‘general clause’ to get round the 
problem of contractual incompleteness.  For present purposes, my argument is with the 
Williamsonian version of opportunism and its emphasis on “calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise obscure”. (Williamson, 1985: 47).  I have no 
problem accepting that parties may act in a self-interested manner which can be to the 
detriment of others, but propose that we consider a world in which there is no need to 
take actions to defend against the potential returns from systematically guileful behaviour 
of the type described by Williamson.3  This is the sense in which I propose to consider 
the opportunism-independent, yet contractual, theory of the firm. 
 
There are two strands of literature in which conceptions of the firm or its boundaries are 
independent of the existence of (Williamsonian) opportunism.  Neither of these 
represents a complete theory of the firm, but they do represent stepping-stones on the 
way towards a more complete picture of the firm. 
 
Divergent Capabilities 
The first area is where firm boundaries may be partly determined for non-opportunistic 
reasons under circumstances in which there is strong divergence between the 
capabilities/capacities of firms, and therefore in which knowledge transfer is either 
impossible or prohibitively costly.  This aspect is perhaps most clearly developed in 
theoretical writings on the multinational enterprise and the rationale for foreign direct 
                                                          
3 In terms of the two different approaches to transaction costs identified by Alchian and Woodward (1988) 
– one concerned with moral hazard problems and monitoring in teamwork, the other with quality and 
performance of contracts – my concern is firmly with the latter. 
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investment, and  has a substantial pedigree running from Teece (1986) through Kogut and 
Zander (1992, 1993) to Hallwood (1994).  The essence of the matter is the contention that 
internalization may take place in order to effect knowledge transfer between parties 
which differ markedly in their capacities for technological absorption, but without the 
need for opportunistic behaviour by any party to a contractual agreement.  This may 
occur either because some parties are better than others at effecting such transfers of 
knowledge because of their superior ‘embedded capabilities’ (Kogut and Zander 1993), 
or because low-knowledge (and therefore high-cost) producers can offer only low rental 
values for the necessary firm-specific knowledge under a licensing agreement, rendering 
the establishment of a wholly-owned subsidiary the logical outcome (Hallwood 1994). 
 
Although there has been a debate in the literature on whether this scenario implies a lack 
of transaction cost issues and/or market failure (Kogut and Zander 1995; Love 1995, 
1997; McFetridge 1995; Hallwood 1997), there is some agreement that divergence in 
technological capability does provide a limited rationale for an opportunism-independent 
explanation for firm boundaries.  
 
Future Uncertainty 
The second opportunism-free approach suggests that contractual difficulties may arise as 
the result of genuinely different views of an uncertain future. Langlois (1997) argues that 
even where the parties to a contractual agreement trust each other in virtually every 
respect, they may have such genuine and irreconcilably different views of what their 
contractual obligations are under conditions of great uncertainty that joint ownership is 
the only method of “reconciling divergent visions of the uncertain future” (Langlois 
1997:16).  This is the strand of the literature echoed by Conner and Prahalad (1996) in 
their attempt to portray knowledge-based theory as an opportunism-independent 
theoretical understanding of the firm.  Here, even truthful parties may run into contractual 
difficulties because differences in individuals’ knowledge – which can never be fully 
known by another party – can lead to radically different judgements about the expected 
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outcomes arising from a contractual agreement, especially where there is some 
uncertainty over those outcomes4. 
 
While the Langlois approach outlined above puts the emphasis on uncertainty, Madhok 
(1996) develops a similar theme by using bounded rationality as the key. He argues that 
bounded rationality appears in two guises: first, an inability to monitor and control 
behaviour given the likelihood of opportunism, and second, constraints on firm 
capabilities because they do not possess the necessary knowhow. The latter element is 
essentially Langlois’ ‘dynamic transaction costs’5: but despite the superficial similarities 
with Langlois, Madhok suffers from the belief – shared by Kogut and Zander (1993) – 
that a lack of opportunism implies a lack of market failure (Love, 1995).  These 
differences notwithstanding, there is a clear strand of literature which acknowledges the 
organizational implications of divergent views of the future which need not depend on 
contractual parties lying or cheating, but which does acknowledge the implications of 
self-interested behaviour. 
 
 
3.  A More General Opportunism-independent Theory 
 
The two scenarios outlined above might be regarded as ‘special’ opportunism-
independent theories – they each develop a limited area in which opportunism is not 
necessary for some aspects of firm organization or structure. The question remains 
whether it is possible to develop a more general theory which can explain the existence 
and organization/boundaries of the firm over a wide range of circumstances without 
recourse to the concept of opportunism as defined earlier.  
 
                                                          
4 Although couched in terms of knowledge differences, Conner and Prahalad’s analysis is similar to 
Rubin’s  phenomenological approach to the problems of complex contracting. This hinges on bounded 
rationality arising from  the unique ‘here-ness’ of an individual’s personal experience which “…will impel 
them to violate accepted rules when confronted with a perceived opportunity to benefit from that violation” 
(Rubin, 1996: 129) . 
5 Langlois describes dynamic transaction (or governance) costs as “the costs that arise in real time in the 
process of acquiring and coordinating productive knowledge .” (1997: 11). 
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I argue in this section not only that it is possible to do so, but that two writers have 
already developed approaches to the firm which, in different but related ways, fulfil this 
criterion. I do not suggest that either has developed a theory of the firm complete in every 
respect, but that their work puts us much closer to a general opportunism-independent 
theory than is contained in the two special cases outlined earlier.  One, Ronald Coase, 
does so by explicitly addressing the problems of market contracting, but parts of his 
original important message have become somewhat obscured along the way by the 
edifice of transaction-cost economics erected by his followers.  The other, Harold 
Demsetz, adopts a much more conventionally neoclassical vision of the firm, but 
nevertheless develops a rationale for both the existence and organization of the firm 
which is not dependent on opportunism and which puts the costs of knowledge use and 
acquisition in a central position.  Both Demsetz and Coase have been invoked endlessly 
in the recent literature on the theory of the firm, and especially in the debate on 
knowledge-based theories and the need for opportunism (Foss, 1996a, 1996b; Conner and 
Prahalad 1996; Madhok 1996).  I contend, however, that the significance of both writers 
has to some extent been overlooked in this literature, and is in need of reappraisal and 
extension.  
 
Conner and Prahalad (1996) develop a knowledge-based theory of the firm which they 
argue is independent of opportunism, and which depends on two key effects: the 
‘knowledge-substitution’ and ‘flexibility’ effects.  It is the first of these with which we 
are presently concerned.  The knowledge-substitution effect “involves the relationship 
between taking an action and internalizing the wisdom upon which it is based.” (Conner 
and Prahalad 1996:485): in the context of the relationship between manager and 
subordinate, this involves the manager requiring the subordinate to act according to the 
former’s judgement, rather than the latter’s own. This is essentially Demsetz’s (1988) 
concept of ‘direction’6 i.e. in the context of the employment relation, a manager’s 
knowledge partly substitutes for the employee’s knowledge.  However, Demsetz’s notion 
of direction has applicability beyond a firm characterized merely as an employment 
                                                          
6 Foss (1996b) also makes this point. 
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contract, and can explain how “the vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by the 
economies of conservation of expenditures on knowledge.” (1988: 159) 
 
The crux of the argument is to explain how specialized knowledge can be rendered 
economically useful to those who do not possess it. Learning the knowledge can be 
rejected as an expensive option which undermines the gains from specialized learning.  
Buying the knowledge may be possible under some circumstances, but in many cases the 
economically useful elements of knowledge derive not merely from codified facts but 
from the tacit theory which underlies those facts, and which cannot easily be transferred 
by contractual means. Instead, argues Demsetz: 
 “Those who are to produce on the basis of this knowledge, but not be possessed of 
it themselves, must have their activities directed by those who possess (more of) 
the knowledge.  Direction substitutes for education (that is, for the transfer of the 
knowledge itself)” (1988: 157-8, original emphasis) 
 
The reason why this process of direction is efficient is spelled out in a later paper 
(Demsetz 1997), and relies on the existence of economies of scale in the acquisition of 
specialized knowledge. Direction by those in possession of the knowledge permits the 
knowledge to be used by guiding the activities of others without the requirement for those 
others to master the knowledge themselves.  This ‘direction’ may be acquired through 
contractual agreement where it is efficient to do so, or it may be effected indirectly by 
producing and selling goods which require less information to use than to produce them.  
In either case, Demsetz is quite clear that this process of determining the (vertical) 
organization of the firm is independent of opportunism: 
 “The vertical depth of the firm may be considered from the perspective of the 
need for conserving on information costs.  Other costs matter also, but I wish to 
focus attention on the consequences of costly knowledge, and I wish to do so 
without reference to the information costs inherent in transaction and moral 
hazard problems” (1988: 158, emphasis added). 
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Furthermore, in a thought experiment involving a classic piece of reductio ad absurdum 
Demsetz tackles the important point that it is almost impossible to conceive of the forms 
of organization which we actually witness in the world around us without appealing to 
some degree of opportunism.  Suppose we have a utopian world where everyone is 
honourable and there are no unexpected events, and in which there are therefore no gains 
from the exercise of opportunism.  Even in such a world, argues Demsetz, we would still 
witness vertical integration: 
 “That this is so follows simply from the fact that any productive activity can be 
subdivided, and subdivided again and again, so that all activities actually 
undertaken are, and must always be, vertically integrated to a very considerable 
degree.  There is no unit of product, no unit of production process, and no unit of 
human activity that is the analog of an indivisible subatomic particle.  
Opportunism, therefore, cannot explain all or even most of vertical integration” 
(1997: 21). 
 
Demsetz therefore suggests a theory of the vertical organization of the firm which 
requires no opportunism or moral hazard, but which nevertheless recognises the costly 
nature of knowledge acquisition and the economic benefits of knowledge specialization.  
 
There is clearly a connection here with the ‘divergent capabilities’ approach to 
opportunism-independence outlined above: indeed, one could consider direction itself as 
a kind of capability, possessed by some economic agents and not others, which helps 
determine the differential ability to make economic use of specialized knowledge without 
directly possessing it7.  But we can take the argument much further. The key issue is 
whether it is possible to determine an opportunism-independent theory of the existence of 
the firm.  For Demsetz (1997: 8-11) the key to the existence of the firm lies in what he 
calls specialization.  This has nothing to do with the ‘normal’ meaning of the word, 
which implies carrying out a narrow range of tasks, but rather the process of producing 
                                                          
7 Demsetz’s thesis is sometimes reminiscent of the resource-based/capabilities perspective. Indeed, at times 
Demsetz  is almost Penrosean in his analysis: “Each firm is a bundle of commitments to technology, 
personnel, and methods, all contained and constrained by an insulating layer of information that is specific 
to the firm, and this bundle cannot be altered or imitated easily or quickly” (1988: 148). 
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for others.  The firm, therefore, is an entity which is not self-sufficient: production (by 
the firm) is separated from consumption (by those outside the firm). Firms exist because 
producing for others gives rise to efficiency from economies of scale, from the 
advantages of specialized knowledge (i.e. ‘direction’), and finally because of low 
transaction costs The last of these is the inverse of the normal transaction-cost 
interpretation of firm existence, which depends on high transaction costs.  In Demsetz’s 
world of specialized firms, a reduction in transaction costs causes firms to subdivide and 
concentrate on an increasingly narrow range of production: the result is more (and more 
narrowly focused) firms, rather than the substitution of the market for firm activity.  
 
There are three implications of substituting Demsetz’s definition of the firm for the 
employment-contract relationship envisaged by Conner and Prahalad or by Wernerfelt 
(1997).  First, individuals can be firms.  Secondly, firms and markets cannot be regarded 
as substitutes, since markets do not produce. Rather than having the either/or relationship 
implied by transaction-cost theory, firms and markets are essentially complements,8 
because of the productive nature of the former. Thirdly, the one-to-one relationship 
between ‘the firm’ and the employment contract is broken. For present purposes the first 
of these implications is trivial, the second is a mixed blessing,9 but the third is of 
considerable importance, for it represents a genuinely opportunism-independent concept 
of the firm which is not restricted to the employment-contract relationship.10   This is 
important, because viewing the firm exclusively in terms of the employment contract not 
only substantially weakens any claim to have developed an opportunism-independent 
                                                          
8 Holmström (1999) also concludes that firms and markets are complements, but does so from a property-
rights perspective of the firm as a subeconomy, so that “strong market discipline permits the successful 
operation of large and powerful firms” (1999: 90). 
9 A mixed blessing , that is, for transaction cost adherents.  Although viewing firms and markets as 
complements appears to go against a central tenet of transaction-cost theory, it also gets around the tricky 
issue in transaction-cost analysis of what a zero transaction-cost world would actually look like: if there are 
no firms, how are things produced in practice?  Even Coase has some difficulty in conceiving of the direct 
contractual relationships which might exists between factors of production and consumers under such 
circumstances (1993: 65): but a world of no transaction costs poses few problems for Demsetz’s theory of 
‘specialized’ firms. 
10 Admittedly, Demsetz has an agenda in developing this definition of the firm. His vision of the 
specialized firm permits the justification of many of the assumptions underlying neoclassical economics to 
remain intact, such as the continued focus on productive rather than contracting issues, profit maximizing 
behaviour, and a reconciliation of the apparently black-box firm of neoclassical theory with something a 
little more tangible.  
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theory of firm existence (Foss 1996b), but is a link which Coase himself  regrets having 
made inadvertently, and subsequently rejected (1993: 64-5). 
 
Thus Demsetz develops a form of opportunism-independent theory, one which is not 
built on market failure arguments but rather on the productive qualities of firms versus 
markets and on the cost-reducing qualities of specialization. The challenge now is to 
develop an opportunism-independent theory in which the emphasis is more clearly on 
issues of contracting. 
 
In 1988 the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization published a special issue 
devoted to a 50th anniversary retrospective of Ronald Coase’s 1937 article ‘The Nature 
of the Firm’. One of the benefits of this was that it allowed Coase to reconsider the 
influence of his 1937 article. As Demsetz (1997: 20) points out, Coase makes it clear in 
his later writings that he does not believe opportunism offers a special justification for 
vertical integration: markets involve all kinds of coordination problems which, under 
some circumstances, may be resolved through management rather than contractual 
arrangements. Opportunism may exacerbate these problems, but does not lead them into 
being.  
 
But has Coase anything to tell us about an opportunism-independent theory of firm 
existence?  Coase’s original purpose was explicitly to explain the existence of firms; by 
contrast, issues of organization (e.g. vertical integration) were very much secondary and 
not of great interest to him. The key issue is the cost of coordinating contractual relations 
between factors of production, which he sees as the plausible alternative to the existence 
of firms.  Coase clearly describes the purpose of ‘The Nature of the Firm’ as being to 
show that the basic reason for the existence of firms is the avoidance of the costs of 
contracting between factors of production (1993: 67).  In the absence of firms there 
would be vast numbers of possible contractual arrangements “..but, absent firms, none 
would involve the direction of factors of production” (1993: 65, emphasis added).  
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If Coase’s idea of ‘direction’ is the same as that of Demsetz we arrive at a situation in 
which Demsetz’s rationale for the organization of firms is the same as Coase’s rationale 
for their existence. The original 1937 article certainly couches direction in terms of the 
employment relation; it is direction in the sense of managers being empowered, within 
limits, to tell employees what to do.  Unlike Demsetz, Coase’s version of direction 
contains no explicit discussion of the problems of tacit knowledge transfer. Rather, the 
importance of direction for Coase is that it eases the problems of contracting: “The 
emergence of the firm leads to very much less complicated contractual arrangements” 
(1993:66). It might be argued that Coase was implicitly allowing for some degree of 
opportunism in explaining why these arrangements would be complicated, but this 
appears not to be the case. It is simply the cost of coordinating such a large number of 
different contracts that poses problems: by ‘less complicated’ Coase clearly means fewer 
contracts.11 The key issue is that ‘for a series of contracts is substituted one’ – the 
opportunity cost of this arrangement (now called transaction costs) is less than for a series 
of contracts in the open market. There are costs in all this coordination even if there is an 
absence of opportunism.  There may be a less pressing need to draw up and monitor 
contracts in the absence of opportunism, but there is still the need to coordinate all these 
arrangements between factors of production, and this involves (opportunity) costs, 
whether contracts are explicit or not.  This is also consistent with Coase’s emphasis on 
search and information costs as a key element in the costs of market contracting12: much 
of the transaction cost literature following Coase has placed an almost exclusive 
emphasis on the ex post problems of bargaining, policing and enforcement, with 
correspondingly little emphasis on the ex ante costs of search and information. 
 
So whether it substitutes for knowledge transfer or eases the problems of contracting, the 
net effect of direction is the same for both Demsetz and Coase: economic benefits flow 
from permitting managers to direct the activities of workers.  While he expressed this in 
                                                          
11 Despite this emphasis on the complicated nature of market contracting, Coase is a firm believer that 
markets basically work – see his discussion (1993: 68-72) about asset specificity and the ability of long-
term contracts easily to get round apparent problems in the real world, especially on the issue of 
opportunism being curbed by the market. 
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terms of the employment contract, Coase subsequently makes it clear (1993: 65) that he 
erred in appearing to imply that direction should extend only to the employer-employee 
relationship: it should in principle also extend to the direction of the use of capital (i.e. 
equipment or money).  The concept of direction is therefore vital. For Demsetz it 
provides an opportunism-free basis for the vertical boundaries and organization of the 
firm, although not for firm existence.  For Coase, direction and the substitution of one 
contract for many is the essence of the existence of the firm: opportunism may provide an 
additional incentive for direction to occur but is by no means a necessary condition. This 
is an opportunism-independent vision of firm existence. 
 
4.  Opportunism-independent Contracting and Asset Ownership 
 
In order to develop an opportunism-independent theory of the firm which is nevertheless 
contractual it must be shown that contracting is meaningful in the absence of 
opportunism.  This section deals with that point, and with the related issue of whether a 
theory of the firm must look beyond contracts and consider wider issues such as the 
ownership of assets. 
 
Contractual approaches to the firm fall into two broad types. The first is the nexus of 
contracts approach which involves an essentially static optimizing problem under 
conditions of moral hazard and incentive problems, especially where team work is 
present (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976).  The second is more 
concerned with governance mechanisms and incomplete contracting, and sees firms 
arising from transaction-cost and institutional factors, or from asset ownership issues 
(Williamson 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).  The Demsetz and 
Coase visions of the firm outlined above contain elements of both these approaches. 
Demsetz (1988: 154) is certainly explicit in his view that the firm is properly viewed as a 
‘nexus’ of contracts: however, as shown above, in his later work (Demsetz 1997) the 
emphasis has shifted to explaining the existence of the firm in terms of a ‘specialized’ 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 “The most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ production through the price mechanism is that of discovering 
what the relevant prices are” (Coase, 1937: 21) 
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production unit, that is a unit which produces for outside consumption because of the 
efficiency benefits of specialization, and because of low transaction costs13. The Coase 
approach is quite clearly concerned with the problems of contractual incompleteness and 
coordination between factors of production, but with the emphasis on the search and 
information costs involved in finding relevant market prices rather than on the ex post 
contracting problems which characterise Williamson’s later developments.  
 
But why do we need contracts at all if there is no threat of opportunism? The issue here 
revolves around what we think contracts are for, and thus what we actually mean by a 
‘contractual’ approach to the firm. Some writers link the term ‘contractual’ by definition 
to opportunism/moral hazard: “the very notion of contract is hard to rationalize in lieu of 
the notion of opportunism” (Foss 1996b: 522). If opportunism is a necessary condition 
for contracting, and contracting is the essence of the existence/boundaries of the firm, 
then the search for an opportunism-independent theory is indeed doomed to failure. But 
even if contracts are simply defined as a form of promise (i.e. commitment today against 
performance tomorrow), their existence need not depend on opportunism.  Possible 
functions of a contract are not only to guard against opportunism, but to give guidance 
about what to do in the event of an uncertain future (Langlois, 1997) or to eliminate or 
attenuate misunderstandings of fact (Alchian and Woodward’s ‘honest disagreements’). 
In the absence of such guiding mechanisms behaviour may develop which seems 
perfectly reasonable to one party but may be construed as being quite unreasonable by 
another, especially under conditions of uncertainty.  Such behaviour may not be 
‘opportunistic’ in the Williamsonian sense, because it need not be characterised by the 
presence of guile or deceitfulness.   
 
And contracts may have functions which go beyond even these roles. In an analysis of 
competence development and transfer in the UK offshore oil and gas industry, Finch 
                                                          
13 This is not to say that Demsetz has abandoned his belief in the similarity of the authority relationships 
between employer and employee and supplier and customer so famously presented in Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972). “[I]f the contractual arrangements between a firm and its suppliers share characteristics with the 
contractual arrangements between a firm and its workers, and if these characteristics respond to the same 
types of forces, why should we distinguish between them?” (1997: 16).  But here his concern is with the 
internal organization of the firm rather than its existence. 
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(2002) examines the nature of the relationships between the operating companies which 
carry out exploration and development activity and the numerous contracting companies 
which carry out a range of specialist (mainly engineering) tasks for the operating 
companies.  While Finch’s objective is to determine the range of relationships between 
these companies and how this has affected the transfer and development of competences 
in the sector, he makes some relevant observations on the nature of the contractual 
relationships between them. These involve the full gamut of supply-chain management 
issues such as alliances and partnerships as well as more traditional forms of contracting.  
While contractual arrangements do involve designing appropriate incentives and 
performance indicators, they frequently go far beyond this, providing the means to permit 
‘cultural alignment’ between companies with different business objectives, and even 
permitting the optimal level of integration for devolving responsibility and allowing  
appropriate competence transfer from operating company to contractor.  Crucially,  Finch 
finds that contracts have an important role to play in this sector not merely to protect 
against wrongdoing by contractual parties, but to provide the necessary encouragement 
for new technical solutions to engineering problems, and permitting the framework 
within which (personnel-based) competence transfer may occur.  He points out that this is 
a highly knowledgeable community in which (guileful) opportunism is difficult to enact: 
but there are still contracts. 
 
This suggests that seeing contracts entirely as defence mechanisms where there exists a 
threat of opportunism may be an unduly narrow vision: the question is not only why  we 
should have contracts where there is no opportunism in theory, but why it is that we 
continue to see contracts being used even where opportunism is unlikely to be a serious 
economic threat in reality. 
 
I began the discussion of the opportunism-independent view of the firm by suggesting 
that the firm in theory was best seen in terms of a multi-person entity, but which is more 
than merely an employment contract. It has been argued that explaining the firm in terms 
of an employment contract is insufficient, and that a complete theory also has to be able 
to offer an explanation of the ownership of (physical) assets. The true challenge, then, is 
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to find a rationale for the ownership of assets by firms without the need to appeal to 
opportunism/moral hazard (Foss 1996b). This in turn poses the question of whether the 
theories of the firm developed by either Coase or Demsetz deal satisfactorily with this 
issue.  
 
The importance of asset ownership arises from the incomplete contracting or property 
rights approach (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1989; Hart and Moore 1990).  The 
boundaries of the firm are here determined by the efficient allocation of ‘residual rights’, 
the rights to make decisions about production which are not made explicit in any 
contract.  Where the assets brought by two parties to a contractual agreement are highly 
specific, and where opportunism is therefore a credible threat, efficiency may be 
improved by giving one party ownership of both sets of assets, thus vesting the residual 
rights with that party. This in turn, it is argued, not only defines the firm clearly as a 
bundle of assets under common ownership, but also tells us something about the nature of 
the relationship between employers and employees, because employers have the residual 
rights with respect to the physical assets which determine the employees’ productivity. 
 
Although, as indicated earlier, Coase spends some time indicating that his concept of the 
firm extends beyond employment contracting and includes “the contracts that enable the 
organizers of the firm to direct the use of capital (equipment or money) by acquiring, 
leasing, or borrowing it” (1993: 65), he is generally unspecific about the nature of such 
contracts.  Again the issue relates to the gains to be made from substituting one contract 
for many, rather than specifically overcoming opportunism or moral hazard issues by 
replacing market contracting with firm organization.14  Demsetz too spends little time on 
this issue, but when he does address asset ownership he clearly does not regard it as being 
central to the essence of the firm. In his discussion of the knowledge and monitoring 
benefits derived from the firm acting as a ‘central contracting agent’ (1997: 33-34), 
Demsetz rejects Oliver Hart’s (1989) argument that asset specificity and residual control 
rights are important in determining the identity of the central contracting agent. For 
                                                          
14 This is not to say that Coase ignores entirely the issue of asset ownership.  He is perfectly clear in 
discounting specific assets as a likely explanation for vertical integration (1993: 68-71). 
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Demsetz, asset ownership follows the benefits of specialization in knowledge, rather than 
vice versa: 
 “Ownership of an asset is not predetermined.  It should gravitate to the party who 
possess (sic) the specialized knowledge necessary to do a good job of setting the 
general goal of the cooperative effort and monitoring the degree to which various 
owners of inputs accomplish their tasks” (1997: 34, fn 15). 
 
However, that neither Coase nor Demsetz pays particular attention to issues of asset 
ownership need not imply that an opportunism-independent vision of the firm is deficient 
in a crucial area. As two recent and influential contributions have argued, the Hart/Moore 
property rights approach fails to offer a complete explanation of the boundaries of the 
firm, and the importance of asset ownership is overstated in terms of a theory of the firm.  
In the first of these, Wernerfelt (1997) tackles the issue of why employees submit to the 
authority of their employers.  This was initially raised by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) in 
their suggestion that there was no difference between authority in employment and 
(contractual) ‘authority’ in a market relationship, and is resolved in the property rights 
approach by the firm’s ownership of the residual rights to productive assets.  However, 
Wernerfelt points out that authority exists even in circumstances where there is little 
room for the kind of incentive conflicts which give rise to the firm in the property rights 
analysis, such as members of volunteer organizations or the crew of a racing yacht.  If 
incentive conflicts can be separated from authority per se, this suggests that submission 
to authority can be an efficient communication pattern where there are no incentive 
conflicts, and even where such conflicts exist as long as the parties can settle possible 
conflicts up front.  Wernerfelt then goes on to develop a model which explains when each 
of three possible types of contracting for human asset services will be most efficient,15 
based on the communication costs of adjustment involved in each.  But for present 
purposes the importance of Wernerfelt’s analysis lies in showing that there is no 
necessary link between asset ownership and residual rights on one hand, and authority 
relations (or ‘direction’) on the other. 
                                                          
15 The three types of contract are the hierarchy form (i.e. an employment relationship), the negotiation-as-
needed form, and the price list form. 
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In the second contribution, Holmström (1999) argues that that the property rights 
approach does not explain why firms own assets, indeed that it says very little about firms 
at all: rather it is a theory of asset ownership by individuals.  The Hart-Moore model, 
Holmström argues, is subject to precisely the same critique levelled at Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), “that organizational affiliations did not matter for transactions” (1999: 
87).  This is important, because individual ownership of assets does not provide a theory 
of the firm unless individuals are firms16: so the Hart-Moore approach is not a theory of 
firm boundaries, but an entrepreneurial theory of the firm.  “The problem is that there are 
really no firms in these models, just representative entrepreneurs” (Holmström, 1999: 
100).  This in turn matters because concentrating on issues of asset configuration as an 
end in itself is less important than the activity configurations which these imply: the 
important issue is what firms do rather than what they own. 
 
Holmström then goes on to suggest alternative reasons as to why firms rather than 
workers generally own nonhuman productive assets, and does so in a way which echoes 
the wider interpretation of the functions of contracts outlined earlier in Finch’s work.  By 
having assets under a single authority, firms can assign workers in a manner which is 
much more varied than under separate ownership.  The firm can promote, dismiss or 
move workers in any way it deems fit, but only within the set of assets which it owns: it 
is a form of internal capital market.  Crucially, “[b]y focusing on holdups alone, the 
property rights approach overlooks the great variety of instruments that can be used to 
influence employee incentives” (Holmström, 1999: 89), and these incentives go far 
beyond the simple ones of bonus payments and so on, but include much more subtle 
arrangements such as the control of information channels, the assignment of tasks, and 
even espousing a particular corporate culture.  Thus the leverage which the firm has over 
its human assets via the holding of contracting rights over nonhuman assets arises not 
merely from dealing with the holdup power of employees, but from the range of 
instruments which the firm has at its disposal to deal with these issues. 
                                                          
16 As noted earlier, Demsetz is unlikely to regard this as a problem because he explicitly  permits the 
possibility of individuals as firms. 
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This discussion of the wider functions of contracts and of the property rights approach to 
firm boundaries therefore leads to two conclusions.  First, contracting is indeed 
meaningful within an opportunism-free environment, but the functions performed by 
contracts must be viewed as going beyond those of incentive alignment designed to 
protect against wrongdoing.  Secondly, the need for an opportunism-independent theory 
to include an explicit explanation for the firm’s ownership of non-human productive 
assets is easily overstated: not only does the possession of residual rights to such assets 
fail to explain the existence of authority in many circumstances (Wernerfelt 1997), but as 
Holmström indicates, the property rights model fails as a theory of the firm. 
 
5.  Towards an Opportunism-independent Theory? 
 
Although their respective rationales for the existence of firms differ somewhat, there are 
clear similarities between Demsetz’s and Coase’s conceptions of the firm. First, both 
place substantial important emphasis on ‘direction’, the process by which one set of 
economic agents is permitted to exercise control over the activities of human and (in the 
case of Coase) non-human factors of production. Secondly, neither sees opportunism as 
necessary for either firm organization or firm existence: neither Demsetz nor Coase 
appears to have any problems in conceiving of a contractual world in the absence of 
opportunism, a world in which firms may exist either, as in the case of Demsetz, because 
of the benefits of ‘specialization’ (that is, separating production and consumption), or, as 
in the case of Coase, because there are savings to be made under some circumstances by 
replacing many contracts with one through the process of ‘direction’. Thirdly, both 
Demsetz and Coase have a contractual view of the firm, Demsetz from a ‘nexus of 
contracts’ perspective, Coase from the perspective of the problems inherent in market 
contracting. Finally, neither author puts much store on ownership of assets as a means of 
defining the boundaries of the firm. 
 
This takes us far beyond the ‘divergent capabilities’ and ‘uncertain future’ approaches 
discussed earlier. It is perfectly possible to conceive of the firm as a contractual entity, 
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but one which does not necessarily hinge on moral hazard/opportunism issues. For 
example, ‘direction’ is not about rent generation and strategic behaviour under all 
circumstances: the work of Demsetz and Coase highlighted above indicates that direction 
can have an important influence on the choice of governance structures in the absence of 
strategic behaviour on the part of economic agents. Crucially, an opportunism-
independent theory of the firm is not dependent on a knowledge or resource-based 
perspective (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Foss 1996a,b): such a conception of the firm is 
entirely consistent with the neoclassical and transaction-cost perspectives.17  
 
But while we have moved towards an opportunism-independent yet contractual theory of 
the firm, the task is far from complete. For example, Coase is by no means always precise 
in explaining the particular circumstances under which direction, and replacing many 
contracts with one, is likely to be efficient.  A clearer method of determining these 
circumstances is required, with one possible starting point being the adjustment-cost 
approach of Wernerfelt (1997). Wernerfelt shows formally that the choice between the 
general employment relationship in which detailed tasks are not fully specified in 
advance and other forms of contracts (such as ‘negotiation-as-needed’ or set ‘price lists’ 
for services) depends crucially on the extent of adjustments needed in the contracted-for 
service, and the communication costs (rather than incentive conflicts) resulting from this. 
Although limited by viewing the firm exclusively as an employment relationship, 
theoretical work of this type is helpful in moving away from the view of contracts merely 
as incentive-aligning devices. This relates to the work of both Finch and of Holmström 
reviewed earlier, which concentrates on the role of contracting beyond that of incentive 
alignment merely to prevent malfeasance. Holmström’s approach is certainly about 
incentives, primarily in the employment relationship, but stresses that merely paying 
employees based on their holdup power greatly underestimates the variety of instruments 
which firms possess to influence workers.  Finch stresses the nature of contracting 
relationships with those outside the firm, and shows that contracting can play a role in 
competence transfer and development where the exercise of opportunism is not a serious 
                                                          
17 As even Demsetz is prepared to admit, the information/knowledge costs on which he puts so much 
emphasis are an important element in transaction costs (1988: 141), which is why he stresses information 
costs in discussing the benefits of specialization and direction. 
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threat.  This suggests an avenue of research exploring in much greater detail the possible 
roles of contracting beyond those normally considered in an incomplete contracting 
setting, possibly complementing the considerable insights which we now have into 
situations in which we do not find contracts when we might expect to do so, such as R&D 
cooperation (Buckley and Chapman 1997, 1998). 
 
In addition, if we are to consider fully a world in which firms contract in the absence of 
Williamsonian opportunism, then it pays to be better informed of the conditions under 
which opportunism is likely to arise.  This relates to the point raised earlier that those 
interested in transaction cost analysis have placed much more emphasis on bargaining 
and decision costs and policing and enforcement costs, rather than the ex ante search and 
information costs stressed by Coase (1937).  Stephen (1996) points out that bargaining 
and policing costs may themselves be a function of which party is selected as a potential 
contracting partner, so that if it is possible to engage in search to discriminate ex ante 
between potential contractors with a high likelihood of opportunism and those with a low 
likelihood, there may be a trade-off between search costs and enforcement costs.  Stephen 
shows that ex ante screening can be an effective substitute for ex post contractual 
enforcement in the case of staff selection and evaluation in the legal profession (Stephen 
and Gillanders 1993), and suggests that where it is possible for potential contractors to 
signal credibly the appropriate characteristics, such screening devices could be used 
elsewhere, such as in prequalification requirements in the oil industry.  This suggests a 
two-stage empirical research agenda; first, determine the extent to which ex ante 
screening is a credible alternative to ex post policing and enforcement in certain settings 
as a means of avoiding opportunistic behaviour, and secondly, where the threat of 
opportunism is very low or absent, examine the rationale for the continued existence of 
contracts under such circumstances. 
 
In summary, my argument is that a theory of the firm which emphasizes contractual 
relations need not depend on Williamsonian opportunism. I do not, however, suggest that 
an opportunism-independent theory of the firm must be contractual. There are certainly 
dangers in concerning ourselves too much with a vision of the firm which depends 
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wholly on contracts and the process of exchange, dangers well recognised by both Coase 
and Demsetz.  In quite different ways, both are concerned with the ability of firms to act 
as more than merely exchange mediums or contractual conduits18.  For Demsetz this is 
clear from his insistence that the essence of the firm is its “productive arrangements” 
(1997: 4) and his view that the difference between markets and firms is that markets do 
not produce anything.  Coase expresses similar concerns about the way in which 
transaction-cost theory has developed. It has: 
 “..encouraged an undue emphasis on the role of a firm as a purchaser of the 
services of factors of production and on the choice of contractual arrangements 
which it makes with them.  As a consequence…economists have tended to neglect 
the main activity of a firm, running a business” (1993: 65, emphasis added). 
 
Coase’s warning is highly apposite when searching for any construct of the firm which is 
actually useful either for economists or strategy writers.  For example, possibly the major 
virtue of the resource-based approach is that it reminds us that firms are more than 
merely the sum of the contracts which determine their boundaries, but are entities which 
can create value - not merely reduce (transaction) costs - in a way that would not happen 
in the market (Conner, 1991). Increased emphasis on ‘running a business’ is therefore to 
be welcomed, but this does not mean that we must abandon conceiving of the firm as a 
contractual entity.  
 
                                                          
18 Coase and Demsetz are not alone in these concerns.  Kay (2000) also argues that there has been an undue 
emphasis on contractual relations in the theory of the firm, to the neglect of decisions.  “Firms can make 
decisions, markets can only stimulate and inform decisions…A firm can allocate resources without a 
market but markets cannot allocate resources without firms.” (p. 696) 
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